Dominant party systems are prevalent on the African continent although to date most of the countries are formally democratized and hold regular and rather fair elections. A majority of scholars consider dominant party systems to be inimical for a democratic consolidation. Yet, a minority observes a stabilizing effect of dominant party systems which in turn is considered to be important for democratic consolidation. In this paper, I show that both notions can be wrong and at the same time right: I present evidence that there exist different kinds of dominant party systems which are explained by different structural characteristics of the countries they belong to. I consider the different kinds of dominant party systems to exert different effects on the process of democratic consolidation. * Jonathan van Eerd, M A UZH,
1 Introduction "A competitive party system protects the nation against the discontents of its citizens: grievances and attacks are deflected from the overall system and directed toward the current set of powerholders." (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, 4) Lipset and Rokkan assume a competitive party system to be a crucial precondition for the consolidation of a democracy. If there is no political alternative to the current government in a political system, the system will be equated with the current powerholders. If that government then performs poorly, its performance will cast a cloud over the entire political system. Therefore, many scholars consider African electoral democracies without the experience of a peaceful change of incumbency to be on a low consolidation level per se (Bogaards, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Kotzé and Garcia-Rivero, 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001) . 1 In his index of democratization, Vanhanen (1984) even measures the level of democracy by the degree of effective party competition in a political system. I find this dominating theoretical perspective problematic as most of Africa's party systems in the context of the third wave of democratization beginning in the 1990s are characterized by a lack of competition (Bogaards, 2000; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007) . In so called "dominant party systems", one party wins in at least three successive and passably fair elections an absolute majority in parliament as well as the presidency (Bogaards, 2004; Sartori, 2005 Sartori, [1976 ). For instance, in Botswana, continuously democratic since its independence in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) rules uninterruptedly. In South Africa, which is praised for its peaceful democratic revolution in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) is in power unchallengedly since then. Hence, this would mean that these two countries which are commonly regarded as showcases of African democratization (but also most of the other African countries) are making no progress in their democratic consolidation at all.
Yet, a minority of scholars points to the stabilizing effect dominant party systems have on young democracies in the developing world (Carothers, 2002; Du Toit, 1999; Pempel, 1990a; Pempel, 1990b) : According to Du Toit (1999, 217 ), Botswana's dominant party BDP "pave[s] the way for consolidation and stabilization" due to its technocratic approach which requires a dominant position in the political system. How is Botswana's success possible without effective competition which "systematically improves the performance of the organization for the social circle of which the competitors are part" (Bartolini, 1999, 442; cf. Bogaards, 2000, 175) ? According to Bartolini, it is a question of the degree of the incumbency vulnerability, i. e. the theoretical possibility that an incumbent government will be ousted when its performance is poor, and not of effective government change (cf. Bogaards, 2000, 176) . In this sense, the fact that Botswana's dominant party BDP has been facing the same stable opponent (Botswana National Front (BNF)) since 1969 might help to perpetuate its good political performance.
Accordingly, this paper argues that there exist two types of dominant party systems in Africa. These are defined by their different degrees of the dominant party's theoretical possibility to be ousted: one type is the dominant party facing a stable opposition and the other type is the dominant party facing a fluid and rather pulverized opposition. In what follows, I demonstrate the conceptual and empirical foundations of my disaggregation of the dominant party system concept. Sections 2 and 3 present the theoretical foundations of the concept. Section 4 presents first empirical evidence indicating that the two different types of dominant party systems (a) are related to different institutional, economic and social characteristics of the countries they belong to and (b) have a different effect on democratic consolidation.
For the empirical part, I will draw on a dataset of party systems which updates, enlarges and slightly recodes recent data on African party systems by Lindberg (2006; and myself (van Eerd, 2009 ).
Conceptualizing African Party Systems
Scholars describe African party systems (1) exclusively by their fragmentation-degree, indicating a party system's competition structure (Bogaards, 2000; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Young, 2004) or (2) both by their fragmentation-and institutionalization degree. The latter indicates the stability of the inter-party competition (Bogaards, 2008; Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Lindberg, 2007; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005) . Some of the above-mentioned scholars prefer Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) continuos Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties Index (ENPP) to measure the competition structure of African party systems because of its easy computability, approved application for the description of western countries' party systems, and suitability as a dependent variable in OLSregression models (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005) . However, research by Bogaards (2004) and myself (van Eerd, 2009 ) which deals exclusively with measuring problems regarding the competition structure of African party systems demonstrates that the ENPP-Index is not suitable in the African context because it overestimates the number of relevant parties and hence a party system's competition intensity when a party has an absolute majority in parliament. This problem is even addressed by Taagepera (1999) himself.
In this sense, I will use Sartori's (2005 Sartori's ( [1976 ) more qualitative counting rules of relevant parties and his corresponding typology of African party systems to capture the competition structure. Sartori's typology differentiates between dominant-authoritarian, dominant, non-dominant and "pulverized" party systems. I conflate the categories of non-dominant and pulverized party systems into one category of non-dominant party systems because the main difference in Africa lies between dominant and non-dominant party systems (van Eerd, 2009 ). I classify a party system as a dominant party system if the same party achieves an absolute majority and the presidency for at least three times in a row or if it wins an absolute majority and the presidency and it has been already the dominant authoritarian party in the precedent time period where no formal multiparty elections were hold. Sartori (2005 Sartori ( [1976 , 217) devised his typology specifically for the "fluid polities"
and not yet institutionalized party systems of Africa. He defines institutionalization by the existence of a "solidly entrenched mass party". I prefer a more clear-cut concept of institutionalization as devised by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) . By doing this, we get to a preciser and more useful impression of the institutionalization degree of African party systems compared to Sartori's operationalization where the category of institutionalized party systems probably would turn out more or less empty in Africa because we would not know what makes an African party a "solidly entrenched mass party". This does not preclude us to still rest on his African-devised typology of the competition structure, whereas finer categories of the party competition structure than the dominant versus non-dominant categorization are still not meaningful in the African context as there exist too few and too unstable non-dominant party systems for sub-dividing this category further (van Eerd, 2009 ).
However, can dominant party systems ever be regarded as being institutionalized? Do the concepts of dominance and institutionalization go together? Mainwaring and Scully (1995) stress the significance of a party system's institutionalization degree for the consolidation of a democracy. Thereby, their term of an "institutionalized party system" implies a functioning recruitment of politicians, the aggregation and representation of collective interests as well as a heuristic orientating function towards the electorate. They consider a party system to be institutionalized if the following dimensions are fulfilled: a) regularity of inter-party competition, b) stable party roots in society, c) legitimacy of parties and elections and d) independence of party organization. If parties' competitive interactions do not follow certain stable patterns and are rather fluid it is hard for voters to understand which interests the parties represent. Voters cannot hold the parties in charge accountable for a bad performance if parties appear and disappear from one election to the next. In such a situation, parties do not fulfill their role of linking society with the political system, the legitimacy of the political system remains weak, and "democrats can not relax" which means democracy remains unconsolidated (Schedler, 2001, 85) .
In addition, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) consider the existence of programmatic linkages between the political parties and society to be a necessary precondition for an institutionalized party system. If programmatic linkages are missing, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) assume a predominance of clientelistic mobilization by the parties which prevents not only the fulfillment of the required orientation function, but also a longer-term linkage to the electorate. The outcome is a highly volatile electorate, the instability of the party system and -so Mainwaring and Scully -a tendency towards dominant party systems (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) . Thus, if we think this argument through, the existence of a dominant party system in Africa would indicate a low institutionalization and low democratic consolidation level in such countries.
However, it is far from clear that every dominant party in sub-Saharan Africa is a product of a non-institutionalized party system and a predominance of clientelistic linkages between volatile parties and volatile constituents. Concerning the above mentioned Botswanan case, Du Toit (1999, 217) considers it the other way round: According to Du Toit's assessment, Botswana's dominant Party BDP "pave[s] the way for consolidation and stabilization" due to its technocratic approach which requires a dominant position in the political system. Pempel (1990b) supports this perspective by regarding mobilization crises -which most of the sub-Saharan African countries faced after the implementation of a democratic constitution -as a window of opportunity for the formation of a dominant party by democratic means. He stresses the dominant parties' need for a national project so as to be perceived as the indispensable saviour of a nation in crisis, and hence able to consolidate its dominant position. Such a national project is the most likely possibility for a dominant party to foster programmatic linkages and in its last consequence advance the consolidation of a young democracy.
In addition, a dominant party provides at least some amount of regularity because the individual voter always knows who is to blame in case of a political system's bad performance. However, if opposition parties are fluid, voters will find no trustworthy alternative to cast their vote on. So, maybe dominant party systems are not per se institutionalized because they deliver stability by forming the government for several elections in a row and also not per se non-institutionalized because their linkage towards the electorate is predominantly clientelistic, but there exist different kinds of dominant party systems which are born by different linkage strategies: Some dominant party systems feature predominantly clientelistic ties between voters and parties and others feature an increasing share of programmatic linkages between the electorate and the parties.
Basing one's categorization assessment on election results, different dominant party systems can only be identified by looking at the institutionalization degree of the opposition parties. Thereby we assume that stable oppo-sition parties are a bigger threat to the dominant party then fluid opposition parties. We remember Bartolini's above-mentioned theoretical competition argument and expect that a stable opposition to the dominant party will enhance the political system's performance and legitimacy so that, in the end, democrats can relax. If and how the presence of stable opposition parties indicates a growing importance of programmatic ties will be discussed further below and is ultimately a question of empiricism.
To date, scholars mainly try to measure the institutionalization degree of a party system as a whole and conflate incumbent and opposition parties' constituting parts in the assessment process (Erdmann and Basedau, 2007; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005) . They use Pedersen's (1979) volatility index which adds the net changes of the parties' gained and lost seat shares in an election and divides them by two (Volatility = 1/2 * n i=1 |V oteshare t − V oteshare t−1 |) whereas the values range between 0 and 100 and high scores of volatility indicate a low institutionalization degree of a party system. To base one's judgement of the institutionalization degree of a party system exclusively on conflated volatility measures is problematic: First, because, on average, dominant party systems would exhibit much lower volatility scores because at least 50 percent of the whole vote remain with the same party from one election to another. Second, established parties can lose substantial amounts of the vote share, while in turn other established parties win substantial amounts. In this case, the resulting high volatility degree does not signify a de-institutionalized party system (cf. Lindberg, 2007, 225) .
The latter objection can be met by following Lindberg's (2007) procedure: He bases his judgements about a party system's institutionalization on the qualitative assessment of several additional indicators besides the volatility degree. Lindberg (2007, 230-234) assesses a party system's institutionalization degree by holding stable numbers of contesting parties, low numbers of new parties voted in parliament, and low numbers of parties voted out of parliament as signs of an institutionalized party system. Stable largest and runner-up parties in parliament are a further requirement for assessing a party system to be institutionalized. He considers a volatility degree of values below 33 to signify an institutionalized party system. Yet, values above 33 will not signify non-institutionalization if seats are exchanged between established parties which is a sign of healthy competition.
Nevertheless, Lindberg's procedure does not solve my first objection that dominant party systems display naturally much lower volatility scores than non-dominant party systems. Besides that, in a dominant party system the largest party does not change by definition. That stands in contrast to Lindberg's procedure where a strong sign for non-institutionalization are cases where the position of the largest party changes to a party which is new in parliament. Of course, in dominant party systems, this can not happen by definition. Hence, it does not come as a surprise, that in Lindberg's dataset of 22 African party systems, 7 out of 11 party systems categorized by him as being institutionalized are dominant party systems. That being the case, would somewhat devaluate his effort to code the institutionalization degree of African party systems. One could just look at the competition structure of an African party system -dominant or non-dominant -and then roughly know its institutionalization degree without considering figures of stability.
So, to assess the institutionalization degree of African party systems when being confronted with dominant party systems I do not only consider Lindberg's indicators but add additional figures summarizing exclusively the characteristics of the opposition parties in a dominant party system. First, this will be the parliamentary seat share of the runner-up party where values below 10 percent are a sign for non-institutionalization. Second, I additionally compute the volatility score of the opposition parties on their own. Thereby, I consider values larger than the approximate mean for legislative opposition volatility of 45 to be a sign for non-institutionalization (note that this threshold is higher than Lindberg's threshold for total legislative volatility because net seat share changes loom relatively larger without the seat share changes of the dominant party). Third, I also have a look at the fragmentation of the opposition parties by computing opposition parties' ENPP-value (cf. Emminghaus, 2003, 110-113) . Scores above the mean of 3.27 indicate a fragmentation of the opposition which should help the dominant party to stay in power according to the motto "divide and conquer". The reader should know that none of this criteria stands on its own to allocate the institutionalization degree of a dominant party system. In their combination and together with Lindberg's criteria they form a picture of an African dominant party system, that is in some cases more accurately described by the word "institutionalized" and in others by the word "noninstitutionalized" and should signify -in the spirit of Bartolini (1999) (cf. section 1) -if a dominant party faces a meaningful opposition or not.
Regarding data for coding dominance or non-dominance I rely on my preliminary work (van Eerd, 2009) To prove that my disaggregation of the dominant party system concept in Africa has any analytical value, I have to show that first, it is related to an African country's dominant linkage strategies which link the voter to the party he/she is voting for, and second, that it is related to an African country's other possible explanatory factors for the two types of dominant party systems. Last but not least, I want to demonstrate the relationship between the two types of dominant party systems and the democratic consolidation level of a respective African country. For this undertaking, in the following section, i delineate a potential theoretical framework for explaining the two different types of dominant party systems in Africa and their connection to different democratic consolidation levels.
Correlates of African Party Systems
As mentioned before, the two types of dominant party systems may be explained by the prevailing mobilization strategies applied by the parties in an African country. Parties can mobilize their voters by three broad strategies, which hardly ever occur exclusively on their own in a country: Traditional mobilization works through the voters having a traditional and emotional loyalty towards the politicians and the parties they vote for. Clientelistic mobilization strategies are prevalent if parties mainly provide voters private goods in exchange for their vote. Programmatic mobilization strategies work through the promise and provision of public goods from which's consumption also opponent voters or non-voters can not be excluded (cf. Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) . Accordingly, Van de Walle (2003) explains the -according to his observation -prevalence of African party systems featuring a dominant party system and volatile opposition parties with the prevalence of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters which work to the advantage of the dominant party. This prevalence of clientelistic linkages means a heightened incumbency advantage because the required resources for clientelistic mobilization are usually concentrated at the state level in Africa. Quite often, we can even speak of a clientelistic monopoly of the dominant party which it may use to co-opt opposition parties and their politicians and turning them into further clients (cf. Van de Walle, 2003) . Such co-optation offers deter opposition parties and politicians from strategically coordinating their campaigns with other opposition parties, from building successful coalitions, and from establishing programmatic profiles to which voters can relate their expectations. The result are volatile and fragmented opposition parties. Under such circumstances, the dominant party has no theoretical competition to fear and therefore no incentive to promote and perform good public policies; as long as it has enough resources to "feed" its clientelistic electorate. However, a poor performance will imply a low legitimacy for a political system and a low democratic consolidation level.
Yet, this theoretical framework does not explain deviating cases like Botswana, to some extent South Africa, and more countries where a dominant party is confronted with a stable and non-fragmented opposition and the political system scores relatively high regarding its democratic consolidation degree. At least in such countries, programmatic mobilization-strategies must play a bigger role (that does not imply that clientelistic mobilization-strategies do not play a role at all in these countries).
Hence, I reconsider the discussion above by drawing on Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s (2003) more formalized political economy approach which they name "selectorate theory". So far, it is used for explaining the political survival of autocratic and democratic regimes.
According to their theory, political systems with a large selectorate (almost every resident of a country is enfranchised; for simplicity's sake, I use the term "electorate" in the following) and a small winning coalition (the electoral system is rigged, so that only a few people -the ones who are in charge of rigging the election -are relevant for selecting the leader and the governing party) tend to perpetuate the dominance of a party. This is due to such political systems' inherent incentive for the dominant party to provide mainly private goods instead of public goods.
In general, the survival of a party in every political system depends on its ability to credibly promise the provision of goods. Because dominant parties backed by a small winning coalition can promise private goods instead of public goods, they have an inherent advantage compared to parties backed by large winning coalitions (the electoral system is fair, the party needs to win 51 percent of the electorate as the winning coalition) who have to resort to the provision of public goods. In a system with a large electorate and a large winning coalition, an opposition party can credibly offer better public policies because a large-coalition based dominant party depends on effective public policy, which can easily be harmed by external shocks from the international system. In small-coalition systems however, it is hard for a potential opposition party to credibly promise the delivery of private goods to potential defectors of the winning coalition of the incumbent party. Bueno de Mesquita et al. summarize this perverse incentive to provide private goods in small coalition-systems as follows: Bad policy is good politics! However, this does not explain how dominant parties in rather fair and formally correct African electoral democracies (large selectorate and large winning coalition) -which are this paper's main target cases -manage to survive. To reach their large winning coalition they would need to provide effective public policies which makes their prospect of surviving more insecure. Accordingly, in the OECD-World, dominance of one party is an uncommon phenomena (cf. Pempel, 1990a) . However, in African electoral democracies with rather fair elections we quite often come across dominant party systems.
The phenomena of "ethnic or bloc voting" may explain this discrepancy: In many African countries, voters are not formulating their preferences based on programmatic appeals but rather due to traditional and emotional linkages with the big man/chief of their village/ethnic group (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; O'Brien, 1999; Smith, 1986; Van de Walle, 2003) . So the potential large winning coalition remains small. The dominant party only has to win the majority of the ethnic leaders providing a bloc of votes. So, even in a rather fair democratic setting, the dominant party can resort to the provision of private goods to ethnic leaders i.e. implement bad policies which are considered good politics for sustaining "the cycle of dominance" (cf. Pempel, 1990a) . Dominant parties that are not based on the combination of traditional and clientelistic linkages cannot profit from these feedback-mechanisms. Therefore, they are backed by a large winning coalition and will consequently resort to programmatic linkage strategies which advance the consolidation of democracy and the decay of the incumbent party's dominance in the long run.
To summarize: I assume that on the one hand there exist dominant party systems in Africa whose genesis resembles more their one-party state predecessors, i.e. that are born by rather unfair elections, ethnic bloc voting, or both, and can be detected by election results that produce volatile and fragmented opposition parties besides the dominant party. On the other hand, I assume that there exist dominant party systems in Africa which resemble more their western counterparts, i.e. that are born by rather fair elections and ethnic bloc voting is of minor importance. I hypothesize that they can be detected by election results that produce stable opposition parties besides the dominant party. Accordingly, I assume that non-institutionalized dominant party systems have more in common with non-institutionalized non-dominant party systems than with institutionalized dominant party systems. In this line, institutionalized dominant party systems should be related to the same constituting factors as institutionalized non-dominant party systems.
My case selection includes all elections for the lower house of African countries between 1990 and 2008 which meet some minimum fairness standards of competition, and where at least two consecutive multiparty elections took place that had not been interrupted because of a coup or a military intervention (cf. Lindberg, 2007) . Countries in respective election years which have a Freedom House political rights rating (PR) of 6 and 7 are excluded because I consider their election results to be an exclusively fabricated product. Otherwise, I account for fairer but still somewhat rigged elections by using Lindberg's (2006; variable "were the elections essentially judged free and fair?" and data which bases its rating regarding the fairness of elections on mission statements and reports from international and domestic election observation teams. Lindberg codes elections' fairness in four ordinal categories. If the incumbent regime organized a complete charade he considers an election's fairness as "No, not at all"; "No, irregularities affected outcome" applies, when the elections had a potential to be regarded free and fair, but there was a considerable amount of fraud that affected the results. Lindberg then codes elections "Yes, somewhat" fair, if there where some flaws, but they did not affect the election outcome, and "Yes, entirely" when there were no flaws at all. Note that the most unfair category remains empty because of my exclusion of countries which have a PR rating of 6 and 7. I estimate missing values by linear interpolation based on Freedom House PR data. Because Kitschelt's Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2 is still under progress I have no proximate data on the saliency of the different mobilization strategies in Africa. However, I can use indicators which measure the relative strength of incentives for African parties to rely on traditional and clientelistic mobilization strategies. I borrow the proxy and the corresponding data for the strength of the clientelistic structures from Linder and Bächtiger (2005). They operationalize clientelistic structures with the extendedness of family and kinship systems. Their corresponding index ranges from 0 to 100. Thereby, 0 indicates no familistic structures at all, and 100 the most extended kinship system. Countries with extended kinship systems should exhibit strong incentives to mobilize voters by clientelistic means. Alternatively, I also test Transparency International's inverted Corruption Perception Index where high values signify high corruption levels.
Because I have to date problems to gather district level data for the identification of ethnic bloc voting patterns, I attempt to proxy the effects by relying on Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich's (2003) data on ethnopolitical cleavages. They measure the effective number of ethnopolitical groups and the geographical concentration of ethnopolitical groups in a country (cf. Gurr, 1993) . I assume that higher effective numbers of geographically concentrated ethnopolitical groups signify higher saliency of ethnic and traditional voting patterns in a country and hence provide a stronger incentive for clientelistic and traditional mobilization strategies. Alternatively, I assume an U-shaped relationship between the number of ethnopolitical groups and their saliency. I assume that ethnopolitical fractions are most salient when low numbers like two and three relevant ethnopolitical groups and high numbers above five relevant ethnopolitical groups exist. Accordingly, I center and square the number of effective ethonopolitical groups variable and at the same time replace effective number of ethnopolitical groups values of one relevant ethnopolitical group with zero. I hypothesize that the incentives for mobilizing voters clientelisticly are higher in countries with high poverty levels, because voters can be bought by relatively low costs. Hence, I also look at the relationship between the gross domestic product and party systems. I get the data from the World Bank Development Indicators.
Borrowing from the large body of literature concerning the so called "resource curse" I assume that due to large resource-wealth on the state level, a dominant party is able to further stabilize its network of patronclient relationships and to weaken promising oppositional forces (cf. Ross, 2001) . I follow Ross (2001) who operationalizes resource dependency by adding up the export value (current US-Dollar) of mineral-based fuels and the export value of nonfuel ores and metals exports and calculating it as share of GDP (current US-Dollar). Primary data is provided by the World Bank Development Indicators.
Additionally, I account for former british colonial rule (cf. Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom, 2004) . Thereby, I assume that the legacy of indirect rule is beneficial for a later institutionalization of the party system. I account for meaningful democratization before 1990 (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) and the participation of a former liberation movement in the elections. The table shows Lindberg's (2007) corresponding categorizations in the far right column. Disagreements regarding classification of the institutionalization degree are bold in the table. First, we disagree in the classifications of the party systems in Djibouti, Namibia and Tanzania. In Djibouti, no opposition party could ever win a seat in parliament because of a highly distorting party-block voting electoral system. So, we have absolute stability at the expense of absolutely no theoretical competition. In my classification, that indicates an non-institutionalized dominant party system. Nambia and Tanzania display rather moderate volatility scores (on average 12.98 and 9.21 for total volatility as well as 36.22 and 27.16 for opposition volatility). However, after the founding elections, in both countries, the opposition parties de-institutionalize. In the second and third elections, no opposition party manages to reach more than 9.72 percent seat share and initially promising opposition parties are even voted out of parliament. Hence, the Namibian and Tanzanian dominant parties currently face no theoretical competition. Second, in classifications of Kenya and Senegal's elections, we disagree because Lindberg actually classifies them as being "de-institutionalized" due to their changing status of institutionalization from the second to the third, and from the fifth to the sixth election, respectively. In my classification, the reader finds the changing status of their party systems subdivided among three and two categories respectively. Lastly, I categorize Seychelles' elections of 2002 and 2007 as exhibiting pattens of an institutionalized opposition because the same opposition party could gain large seat shares in both elections.
Results
Of the 97 elections, I classify 31 elections of eleven countries as being non-institutionalized dominant party systems which amounts for a share of almost 32 percent of all elections. 16 elections in five countries result in non-institutionalized and non-dominant party systems. That is a share of approximately 16.5 percent. 22 elections in nine countries are classified as institutionalized dominant party systems (almost 23 percent). 28 elections in nine countries are institutionalized and non-dominant (almost 29 percent). Hence I observe a large and roughly balanced variance of my party system classifications in Africa.
Tables 2 through 5 on p. 16 through 17 display the descriptives of the elections' immediate characteristics and of the most important indicator figures for each of the four party system classifications. If we first look at the indicators, we can see that I applied a coherent coding procedure: As expected, non-institutionalized and institutionalized dominant party systems are not discriminable by the means of the respective total volatility data in tables 2 and 3 (19.73 vis-à-vis 16.08). Yet, they are discriminable by my additional four indicators opposition volatility, opposition-ENPP, and the seat share of the dominant party as well as the the seat share of the runner up. Non-institutionalized dominant party systems reach substantially higher means in opposition volatility, the opposition parties' fragmentation and the seat share of the dominant party, as well as a substantially lower mean for the seat share of the runner up opposition party. Hence, by looking at simple election figures, I can demonstrate that it is reasonable to disaggregate dominant party systems according to their institutionalization If we look at the picture of non-dominant party systems (cf. table 1), there are not many developments to detect since Lindberg's (2007) classification. The updated elections show that neither Benin, nor Madagascar, nor Mali, nor Senegal could stabilize their fluid party systems. Senegal is even on track to become a non-institutionalized dominant party system. Lindberg's institutionalized non-dominant party systems remain institutionalized in my update. In addition, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Sierra Leone are new interesting and promising cases (although most recent events in Niger disqualify this notion somewhat). The volatility figures in tables 4 and 5 show the large difference between the two non-dominant types.
Descriptives for each party system classification of the electoral systems' immediate characteristics display a more mixed pattern (tables 2 through 5): First, my data does not show a relationship between the electoral system and my classification of African party systems. We see a large variance of electoral systems in every type of party system. This confirms previous findings by Bogaards (2000) . 4 However, as one can see in table 2, non-institutionalized dominant party systems are slightly related to plurality/majority systems. Second, there is no relationship between the mean of the number of consecutive elections an African country experiences and the party system categorization. Yet, we find no countries among the fluid-dominant ones that experienced more than four consecutive elections. Lastly, elections that are rated with high PR values signify a rather low fairness of the election procedure. As tables 2 and 3 depict, we find them more often among fluid dominant than stable dominant party systems. Yet, fluid non-dominant and stable non-dominant party systems display even lower mean PR values than stable dominant party systems (cf. tables 4 and 5).
In the following, I look at the descriptives of possible explanatory variables that I discussed theoretically in section 3. The reader should keep in mind that my analysis lacks a direct measure for mobilization strategies in Africa. Hence, first, I discuss the descriptives of the explanatory variables that can be considered as theoretically pre-located incentives for a dominant party to rely on clientelistic mobilization strategies. The first one is Lindberg's fairness variable which measures if the election process was considered to be fair by external observers. If this is not the case, the dominant party does not need to win 50 percent of the people as in fair elections, but the majority of persons who help to rig the elections. To win such a small winning coalition can be easily achieved by clientelistic mobilization strategies. Hence if rigging of elections is feasible, parties have a strong incentive to mobilize by clientelistic means (which I can not measure). This in turn should lead to a non-institutionalized dominant party system. Correspondingly, we see in tables 6 and 7 on p. 19 and 19 that the fairness degree is substantially lower in non-institutionalized dominant party systems than in institutionalized dominant party systems. In the two non-dominant types (tables 8 and 9 on p. 20 and 20), the fairness degree is roughly the same as in institutionalized dominant party systems. The second pre-located variable is an African country's resource dependency. Abundant resources should make clientelistic mobilization possible even if elections are rather fair and large fractions of the electorate have to be bought. As expected, the average resource dependency is remarkably higher in non-institutionalized dominant party systems than in institutionalized dominant party systems. Average resource dependency is even lower in the two non-dominant types with fluid non-dominant party systems showing the lowest average resource dependency of all four party system types.
Secondly, we look at explanatory variables which should exhibit immediate interactive effects with clientelistic mobilization strategies (which I can not measure) on the institutionalization degree of a dominant party systems (tables 6 through 9). First, Linder and Bächtiger's measure of the extendedness of kinship systems and familism roughly exhibits the expected Thirdly, we look at other possibly related characteristics in tables 6 through 9. Former British colonies are slightly more numerous among institutionalized dominant party systems than among non-institutionalized dominant party systems. Regarding fluid non-dominant party systems, only the 2007 election results of former British colony Kenya result in such a type. All other fluid non-dominant party systems are former french colonies. This confirms Bernhard, Reenock and Nordstrom (2004) who point to the longterm positive effects of former british indirect rule on African countries' development. The participation of former liberation movements as parties in elections seems to have no weakening effect on opposition parties, as may be expected by some. Rather it institutionalizes the whole party system. Most former liberation movements can be found in institutionalized dominant and institutionalized non-dominant party systems; although, somewhat to the advantage of the dominant parties. Countries that regularly held multiparty elections before 1990 are to be found mainly in institutionalized dominant party systems.
Freedom House's Civil Liberties (CL) index measures democratic qualities in society. Hence, it can be used as a proxy for measuring democratic consolidation (cf. Lindberg, 2006) . Additionally, it has the advantage that it is not related to electoral system characteristics. So, we can examine if the four party system types are related to different levels of democratic consolidation. As expected, institutionalized dominant party systems display higher consolidation levels than their non-institutionalized counterparts. However, both non-dominant types even display higher consolidation levels then institutionalized dominant party systems. I did not expect that regarding fluid non-dominant party systems.
Lastly, in a logistic regression with robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in countries, I examine the statistical significance of the distinguishability between institutionalized dominant and non-institutionalized dominant party systems (table 10 on p. 23). Model 1 estimates the probability of a stable dominant party system compared to a fluid dominant party systems by the two theoretically pre-located variables. Model 2 includes the control variables. It does not include the variable indicating a former British colony, because this variable is correlated with too many other independent variables. Model 3 exhibits the immediate explaining variables, while in model 4, again the controls are included. As we can see, the probability of an institutionalized dominant party system increases significantly when elections are fair. The probability of an institutionalized dominant party system decreases significantly when corruption levels are high (CPI inverse) 5 and increases significantly when countries are richer (GDP). I assume both variables to interact with clientelistic mobilization strategies. When I include the other characteristics, the CPI-Index looses its statistical significance but does not change its sign. GDP remains significant and democratization before 1990 increases significantly the probability of an institutionalized dominant party system.
Conclusion
The paper shows, that I can coherently disaggregate dominant party systems in institutionalized dominant party systems and non-institutionalized dominant party systems. In addition, by looking at African countries' characteristics, I show that this disaggregation undertaking is of analytical value. Institutionalized dominant party systems and non-institutionalized dominant party systems are indeed related to different patterns of the African countries' characteristics which in turn, I assume to be related to different mobilization strategies. And, they exhibit different effects on democratic consolidation levels in society. Yet, while the data shows a clear difference between institutionalized dominant party system and non-institutionalized dominant party systems, it does not thoroughly support my hypothesis that institutionalized and non-institutionalized dominant party systems have in fact more in common with their non-dominant counterparts than with each other.
The research agenda is clear though: I have to find suitable data for p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. mobilization strategies and extensive district-level election data to identify ethnic bloc voting patterns. Including survey data and conducting a multilevel analysis could be an other solution to identify and include different mobilization strategies in the analysis. Perhaps, than the logistic regression output would look more impressive.
